Two avowable quantum communication schemes are proposed. One is an avowable teleportation protocol based on the quantum cryptography. In this protocol one teleports a set of one-particle states based on the availability of an honest arbitrator, the keys and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs shared by the communication parties and the arbitrator. The key point is that the fact of the teleportation can neither be disavowed by the sender nor be denied by the receiver. Another is an avowable quantum secure direct communication scheme. A one-way Hash function chosen by the communication parties helps the receiver to validate the truth of the information and to avoid disavowing for the sender.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the essential features of quantum information is its capacity for entanglement. Entanglement is a uniquely quantum mechanical resource that plays a key role in many of the most interesting applications of quantum computation and quantum information, such as quantum teleportation [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] , quantum key distribution [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] , quantum secure direct communication [11, 12, 13, 14, 15] , quantum secret sharing [16, 17] and so on.
When the pure state entanglement is shared by the sender Alice and the receiver Bob, it allows them to send quantum data with classical communication via teleportation [1] . Quantum computation and quantum information have revealed a plethora of methods for interchanging resources, many built upon quantum teleportation, so it is commonly understood as one of the most important aspects of quantum information theory. Quantum teleportation has attracted widespread attention since the seminal work on teleportation by Bennett et al [1] . So far research work on quantum teleportation has got great development, theoretical and experimental [2, 3, 4, 5] as well.
Another important aspect of quantum information is quantum secure direct communication, in which the two parties communicate important messages directly without first establishing a shared secret key to encrypt them and the message is deterministically sent through the quantum channels, but can be read only after obtaining an additional classical information for each bit [11, 12, 13, 14] .
The purpose of classical signature is to guarantee the communication process neither to be disavowed by the sender nor to be denied by the receiver. In other words, the signature can ensure the validity of the communication. Recently, Zeng et al [18] and Gottesman et al [19] proposed the quantum signature schemes by combining the classical signature idea and quantum cryptography. Obviously the avowable (or signatory) communication schemes are needed in the modern society. In present paper we will first propose an avowable (or signatory) teleportation protocol based on the availability of an honest arbitrator, the keys and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs shared by the communication parties and the arbitrator. Then an avowable scheme of quantum secure direct communication based on digital signature will be presented. Here the receiver can validate the truth of the information and avoid disavowing for the sender with the virtue of a one-way Hash function chosen by the communication parties.
II. AN AVOWABLE TELEPORTATION SCHEME BASED ON QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPH
Quantum teleportation is a technique for moving quantum states around, even in the absence of a quantum communication channel linking the sender of the quantum state to the recipient. An avowable teleportation scheme means that the quantum teleportation can neither be disavowed by the sender nor be denied by the receiver.
Assume that there are members Alice, Bob and an honest arbitrator Charlie in a communication group. Now the sender Alice wants to transmit a set of unknown single-particle states
to the receiver Bob. In order to realize avowable teleportation we need an honest arbitrator Charlie sharing the secret keys K a and K b with Alice and Bob respectively. Of course, the secret keys K a and K b can be generated via mature quantum cryptography, for example BB84 protocol [6] , so that the keys are unconditional security [20] . We also suppose that the arbitrator can make and distribute EPR pairs
between him and Alice, and
between him and Bob. Here C A and C B indicate the particles held by Charlie. Now we present the avowable teleportation scheme in details as follows. 1) Alice sends the arbitrator an application indicating that she wants to teleport a set of unknown quantum states to the receiver Bob. The communication between Alice and Charlie should be encrypted by using the key K a .
2) When the arbitrator Charlie has received the encrypted message of the application, he decrypts the secret information to prove Alice's identity. After that the EPR pair channel between Alice and Bob is established by using entanglement swapping [21] . That is, Charlie makes a measurement on the particles C A , C B in the Bell base {|φ
As
so the outcome of the Bell measurement on the particles C A , C B determines the state of the particles A, B [21] . Then Charlie sends n outcomes of the Bell measurement on the particles C A , C B to Alice secretly by using the key K a .
3) When Alice has received the secret results of the measurement sent by Charlie, she decrypts it. If the result of the measurement is |φ + (|φ − , |ψ + , |ψ − ), Alice performs a unitary transformations I ( σ z , σ x , iσ y ) on the particle A to change the state of the particles A and B into
Here I is the identity operator, σ x , σ y , σ z are Pauli operators. By now n perfect EPR pairs have been built between Alice and Bob. 4) Alice makes a Bell measurement on the particles i and A. The results of the Bell measurement are written as {|Bell iA }. Then she encrypts them using K a (the key between Alice and Charlie) to get
After that she informs Charlie about the outcome of S a via the classical channels. As a matter of fact, the overall state of the particles i, A, and B can be written as
Here |φ
(|00 ± |11 ) iA and |ψ
(|01 ± |10 ) iA are four Bell states of particles i and A. Thus when Alice makes a Bell measurement on two particles i, A, then regardless of the identity of |u i , each outcome will occur with equal probability 1 4 . Hence after this measurement the resulting state of Bob's particle will be respectively
Obviously, in each case the state of Bob's particle is related to |u by a fixed unitary transformation independent of the identity of |u . Thus if Bob obtains Alice's actual Bell measurement outcome, then Bob will be able to apply the corresponding inverse unitary transformation to particle B, restoring it to state |u B in each case. 5) Charlie decrypts S a and obtains {|Bell iA } using the key K a . Then he encrypts {|Bell iA } using the key K b (the key between Bob and Charlie) to obtain
Later on Charlie sends message S c to Bob via the classical channel. 6) Bob decrypts S c and obtains {|Bell iA } using the key K b , then Bob can perform a series of appropriate unitary transformations according to the information of {|Bell iA }, respectively. By far, quantum states {|u i }, (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) has been teleported from the sender Alice to the receiver Bob successfully.
Avowable is the notable feature of this teleportation protocol. Since Alice's key K a and Bob's key K b are contained in the classical information S a and S c , if Alice disavows her behavior, it is very easy to be discovered. At the same time, Bob can not deny having received the quantum state also. Hence the process of above teleportation is of legalization.
III. AN AVOWABLE QUANTUM SECURE DIRECT COMMUNICATION SCHEME BASED ON DIGITAL SIGNATURE
In this section we propose an avowable quantum secure direct communication scheme based on digital signature. A one-way Hash function chosen by the communication parties helps the receiver to validate the truth of the information and to avoid disavowing for the sender.
Suppose that Alice would like to transmit a message M , a classical bit string M = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n }, to Bob secretly, where m k ∈ {0, 1}. We also assume that there are two channels between Alice and Bob. One is a classical communication channel; the other is a quantum communication channel, which is assumed to be insecure and the eavesdropper can manipulate the quantum signal in any way she desires. Next we introduce a procedure of the avowable quantum secure direct communication scheme based on digital signature. The steps of the protocol are as follows.
1) Alice and Bob choose a one-way Hash function H(x) together. The one-way Hash function implies that it is easy to calculate H(M ) from M but it is very difficult to calculate M from H(M ). Here the Hash function can be obtained through a faithful arbitrator, he will be a notarial center when the sender is disavowable.
2) Alice prepares l EPR pairs in the state
(|00 + |11 ) AB . The set of these l EPR pairs is expressed as {φ AB (j)} (j = 1, 2, . . . , l), where l ≈ 2n, then she sends particle B of each EPR pair to Bob via the quantum channel.
3) After having received l particles sent by Alice, Bob choose randomly (l − n) ≈ n particles to test the security of the quantum channel. He measures these particles in the basis {|0 , |1 } or {|+ , |− } at random, where
(|0 ± |1 ), then he tells Alice the base sequence he used. Alice chooses the same bases to perform measurements on the corresponding particles in her side and announces the measurement results. Then they compare their results publicly via the classical channel, if the results are indeed perfectly correlated, it is shown that the channels is secure. We express the untested subset of the EPR pairs as {φ AB (i)} (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), and Alice's and Bob's particles as {φ A (i)} (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) and {φ B (i)} (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), respectively. So far a perfect EPR pair channel has be established between Alice and Bob. 4) Alice encrypts the message M on n EPR pairs. If m k is 0, then Alice performs a unitary transformation I = |0 0|+|1 1| on the particle φ A (k); if m k is 1, she applies a unitary transformation σ x = |0 1| + |1 0|, one of the Pauli operators, on the particle φ A (k). After performing the unitary transformation the resulting state of the EPR pair will be
and
respectively. 5) Alice performs {|0 , |1 } base measurements on {φ A (i)} and announces the results of her measurements via the classical channel.
6) Alice transforms M into H(M ) by the Hash function which they had chosen together, then she sends H(M ) to Bob publicly. 7) After Bob received the outcomes of Alice's measurement and H(M ), Bob performs {|0 , |1 } base measurements on particles {φ B (i)}. By using equations (11) and (12) we can conclude that if the outcome of Alice's measurement is the same with that of Bob's, the message m k is 0; otherwise the message m k is 1. Hence according to the results of both Alice's and Bob's measurement, Bob can obtain the message M ′ . 8) Bob calculates H(M ′ ) from M ′ by the same Hash function which they had chosen together, and compares
, the signature of the message M is true, then accepts it, otherwise discards it.
In our scheme, two parties of the communication, Alice and Bob, transform the information freely, until the sender is disavowable. Because the common Hash function is obtained through an arbitrator, who can testify whether the sender tell a lie or not. At the same time, this scheme can validate the truth of the information, if the message is not authentic, then H(M ) = H(M ′ ), the receiver Bob will discard it.
IV. SECURITY
Our schemes are secure. It is easy to see that these two schemes can not only prevent Eve from attacking but also avoid disavowing. The former is a quantum teleportation based on the quantum cryptography, where we choose the method of BB84 protocol that is unconditionally secure [20] , to generate and distribute the keys as well as to detect the eavesdropping of Eve. The scheme gives a new method for teleportation, in which the fact of the teleportation can neither be disavowed by the sender nor be denied by the receiver. Because there are personal keys K a and K b within the classical information S a and S c , the disavowable behavior must be discovered by the faithful arbitrator. The latter is a quantum secure direct communication scheme based on digital signature. Since H(x) is a one-way function, hence it is difficult for Eve to read the message M from H(M ). The test performed by Alice and Bob can guarantee the security of the EPR pairs which will be used to transmit the secret message. Since the channel is safe, when Bob gets H(M ) = H(M ′ ), he can conclude that the signature of message M is true. At the same time, a one-way Hash function that Alice and Bob possessed together is distributed by the faithful arbitrator, so if the sender is disavowable, whose action can be found easily.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have proposed two avowable protocols for quantum communication. One is a teleportation protocol based on the quantum cryptography, which can avoid disavowing. Another is a scheme for quantum secure direct communication based on digital signature, in which the receiver can validate the truth of the information and avoid disavowing for the sender. It is shown that our schemes are secure.
